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THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF
COMMUNITARIAN RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS: AN
UNNECESSARY CONTROVERSY?
MEADE EMORY* and
LAWRENCE ZELENAK* *
INTRODUCTION
A CHURCH is a community of believers. Just as a church's belief
may take many different forms, so too may its community. Its
members may simply acknowledge that they hold certain shared be-
liefs, they may come together for weekly worship, or they may share
all aspects of their lives through communal living. The fullest form of
religious communion, because of its all-encompassing nature, is that
in which the members share everything-not just praying, but also
working, eating, playing and the other activities of daily life. It is,
therefore, ironic that in two recent cases' the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (the Service) has successfully taken the position that communitar-
ian religious organizations are ineligible for tax-exempt status2 under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). 3
*Partner, LeSourd, Patten, Fleming, Hartung & Emory; A.B. 1954, George
Washington University; LL.B. 1957, George Washington University; LL.M. in Tax-
ation 1964, Boston University. Professor of Law, University of Iowa, 1965-1970;
University of California at Davis, 1972-1975; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown
University, 1975. Member, Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress, 1970-1972.
Assistant to Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 1975-1977.
-Associate, LeSourd, Patten, Fleming, Hartung & Emory; B.A. 1976, Univer-
sity of Santa Clara; J.D. 1979, Harvard University.
1. Martinsville Ministries, Inc. v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9710, at 85,329 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.); Beth-El Ministries, Inc. v. United States, 79-
2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) 9412, at 87,517-19 (D.D.C. 1979)(mem.); see also Basic
Unit Ministry of Alma Karl Schurig v. Commissioner, No. 81-1247 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,
1982) (per curiam) (tax-exempt status denied to a communitarian religious group).
Recently, in Mt. Bether Bible Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 20363-81 "'X" (T.C.
filed Dec. 28, 1981), the Service stipulated that the communitarian religious organi-
zation at issue was tax-exempt. It remains to be seen whether this represents a change
in Service policy or merely a tactical decision that the particular case was a poor
litigation vehicle for the Service.
2. Religious organizations described in § 501(c)(3) are tax-exempt under §
501(a). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 through the date of amendment by the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). This section allows an exemption only if three conjunctive
requirements are met. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. Failure to satisfy
any of these requirements results in a denial of tax-exempt status. Harding Hosp.,
Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974); Hancock Academy, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 488, 492 (1977).
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This Article briefly discusses the history of communitarian religious
organizations. It then examines the Service's position, as approved in
recent court decisions, and discusses why that position may conflict
with section 501(c)(3), fundamental principles of administrative law
and the first amendment. Finally, the Article suggests how the Service
could respond to legitimate concerns about possible abuse of exempt
status by some organizations, without denying exempt status to all
communitarian religious organizations.
I. COMMUNITAR[AN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
In the Christian tradition, religious communal living can be traced
back to the time of the apostles4 and is reflected in the Bible.5 During
the third century A.D., the cenobitic, communal life monastery was
originated by the "Desert Fathers" of Eygpt.6 Cenobitism, which
4. C. Cary-Elwes, Law, Liberty and Love: A Study In Christian Obedience 55
(1951); 1 C. De Montalembert, The Monks of the West from St. Benedict to St.
Bernard 169-71 (1860).
5. Probably the most familiar scriptural description of this form of religious
expression is from The Acts of the Apostles: "And the multitude of them that believed
were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things
which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common .... Neither was
there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses
sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, And laid them down
at the apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man according as he had
need." Id. 4:32-35 (King James) (emphasis in original). Many Christian communitar-
ian religious organizations, both past and present, have found the mandate for their
form of religious expression in the Scriptures. When Scripture is so interpreted, the
communitarian religious life is not a matter of choice, but a dictate. For example,
there is the notion that the members of a religious community constitute, in the
aggregate, the body of Christ: "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in
particular." 1 Corinthians 12:27 (King James). Each member of such a community
can supply, through Christian love, the needs of the others. This vital interrelation-
ship, which some view as the cornerstone of corporate Christian living, is noted in
Ephesians, which speaks of "the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by
that which every joint supplieth." Id. 4:16 (King James). The mandate for daily
fellowship and prayer is evidenced in such passages as: "And they continued stead-
fastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in
prayers." The Acts of the Apostles 2:42 (King James). The "breaking of bread" has
become only a sacramental observance for many Christians. Because the Last Supper
was a partaking of the Passover Feast, complete with meat, bread and wine, how-
ever, many in Christian communitarian religious organizations view the "commu-
nion" of taking meals together as an integral part of their daily religious lives. Also
binding together the members of a communitarian religious organization is the
commonality of belief. The Bible is read as instructing believers to have fellowship
only with those who are committed to Christ: "Be ye not unequally yoked together
with unbelievers ...... 2 Corinthians 6:14 (King James).
6. See D. Knowles, From Pachomius to Ignatius: A Study in the Constitution
and History of the Religious Orders 2-3 (1966). The most famous of the "Desert
Fathers" was St. Anthony, who is called the father of monasticism. C. Butler,
Benedictine Monachism 12 (2d ed. 1924). See generally H. Workman, The Evolution
of the Monastic Ideal (1913).
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required eating, sleeping and living together, 7 embodied the princi-
ples on which all later Christian monasticism was based. 8 Although
modern Christian communitarian life is not limited to monasticism,
with its emphasis on celibacy and the renunciation of worldly goods,
monasteries and convents were the most important form of Christian
communal life for many centuries.9 While the traditional Christian
monastic orders exerted their greatest influence in the Middle Ages,' 0
they continue to thrive today." Their importance to Christianity,
both historically and presently, can hardly be overstated.' 2
Non-monastic Christian communities, modeled after the type of
religious community described in The Acts of the Apostles, have
thrived primarily in Protestant countries.' 3  In the United States,
Protestant common-life organizations have proliferated since the colo-
nial period.' 4 The longest lasting of the American Protestant commu-
7. See W. Nigg, Warriors of God 54-59 (M. Ilford trans. 1959).
8. D. Knowles, supra note 6, at 2-3.
9. Eastern monasticism was given uniformity by the rules of St. Basil the Great
in the fourth century. W. Nigg, supra note 7, at 66-97, 128-54. In the West, the sixth
century Rule of St. Benedict served as a model for all subsequent Roman Catholic
orders. J. Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God 19-32 (C. Misrahi
trans. 1961).
10. See F. Gasquet, Monastic Life in the Middle Ages 197-242 (1922).
11. See The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1981, at 1083-
123 (P.J. Kenedy & Sons Publ. 1981). This directory for the United States lists 100
orders of priests, 24 orders of brothers and 365 orders of sisters. Typically an order
will have a number of communities throughout the country.
12. In A New Charter for Monasticism (J. Moffitt ed. 1970), the Benedictine
monk Dom Jean Leclercq stated: "'A religion flourishes with its monasticism, . . .so
much so that the decadence of the monasticism is not only the sign but also the cause
of the decadence of the religion.' Likewise, the vitality of a monasticism will be the
proof of the vitality of the religion." Id. at 44 (quoting F. De Grunne, Hinduismus,
in Rythmes du Monde 224 (1967)).
13. See F. Biot, The Rise of Protestant Monasticism 60-63 (W. Kerrigan trans.
1963). Although most Protestant communitarian organizations are not monastic,
Protestant monasticism does exist and is given its best known expression by the Taiz6
communities in France, which were founded in the 1940's. Id. at 83-94.
14. See W. Sweet, Religion in the Development of American Culture 1765-1840,
at 292-305 (1952). See generally A. Bestor, Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian And
Owenite Phases Of Communitarian Socialism In America: 1663-1829, at 231-42
(1950); R. Handy, A History of the Churches in the United States and Canada 2291-24
(1976). "The beginnings of communitarian experiments in America were definitely
associated with religion and were either the direct or indirect by-product of revival-
ism. . . .[T]he early religious socialistic experiments in America were preceded by
[periods] of revival in which the great stress was placed upon the salvation of the
souls of individuals; the banding of these 'saved' individuals into communities where
the environment would be most suitable for the saved was but a natural next step.
The sect also, accepting the Bible as the only rule of faith and practice, followed the
pattern of the early Christians as set forth in the Book of Acts where it is stated that
they 'had all things in common' and 'that no one said that any of the things which he
possessed was his own, but they had everything in common.' - W. Sweet, supra, at
292 (quoting The Acts of the Apostles 2:44, 4:32 (King James)).
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nitarian societies has been the Shakers-the United Society of Believ-
ers in Christ's Second Coming-which originated in the late
eighteenth century in New England and still exists today. 15 Their
official narrative explains the impetus behind Christian communal
living:
To constitute a true church of Christ, there must necessarily be a
union of faith, of motives and of interest, in all the members who
compose it. There must be "one body and one bread" and nothing
short of this union in all things, both spiritual and temporal, can
constitute a true church, which is the body of Christ.10
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in communities
of this type in the United States.1 7 Although the reasons for renewed
interest may be rooted in dissent from the values of modern secular
society,18 the adherents of many of these new communities express
themselves by acknowledging and working with the larger society,
rather than by withdrawing, as was done in classical monasticism.'"
Christian communitarianism, despite its long history and continued
vitality, possesses no monopoly on religious common-life organiza-
tions. Buddhist monasticism, which was well-established by the time
of Christ,20 emphasizes the monastic life-style more than does Chris-
tianity.2 1 Also pre-dating Christianity were the Jewish Essene com-
munities which inhabited the Judaean desert from 110 B.C. to 68
A.D.2 2 Monasticism is also a tradition in Hinduism,2 3 Taoism,24 Is-
lam 25 and Jainism.26
The historical foundations of religious communitarianism demon-
strate that its practitioners are trying nothing new. Neither cultists nor
faddists, they are simply trying to live by age-old religious precepts
15. See E. Andrews, The People Called Shakers xi-xii (1953).
16. C. Green & S. Wells, A Summary View of the Millenial Church or United
Society of Believers (Commonly Called Shakers) 51 (1823) (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing I Corinthians 10:17 (King James)).
17. D. Bloesch, Centers of Christian Renewal 11-24 (1964).
18. C. Fracchia, Living Together Alone: The New American Monasticism 14-15
(1979). See generally J. Biersdorf, Hunger for Experience: Vital Religious Communi-
ties in America (1975).
19. D. Bloesch, supra note 17, at 12-24.
20. See C. Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline 18 (1975).
21. J. Bunnag, Buddhist monk, Buddhist layman 36-42 (1973).
22. See C. Ginsburg, The Essenes: Their History and Doctrines 25-27 (1955).
23. See G. Briggs, Gorakhnath and the Kanphata Yogis 1-3 (1938); D. Miller &
D. Wertz, Hindu Monastic Life 11-17 (1976).
24. D. Liu, The Tao and Chinese Culture 12-13 (1979).
25. See W. Watt, What is Islam? 161-69 (2d ed. 1979); N. Ziadeh, Sanusiyah: A
Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam 9-10 (1958).
26. See N. Bhattacharyya, Jain Philosophy: Historical Outline 84-86 (1976); P.
Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification 241-46 (1979).
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that have fallen into disuse. Whatever their theological differences,
these diverse religious organizations agree on the value of communal
living.27  Almost all would be in accord with the following passage
from the Shaker's narrative:
In this united capacity, the strength of the whole body becomes the
strength of each member; and being united ... they have a greater
privilege to serve God than they possibly could have in a separate
capacity, and are better able to be mutual helps to each other; and
they also find a greater degree of protection from the snares of a
selfish and worldly nature.'-
II. THE BETH-EL DECISION
The statutory framework within which religious organizations en-
joy tax-exempt status has developed over a number of years. The tax
exemption for charitable or religious organizations was first enacted in
189429 and reenacted in 1913.30 Groups organized and operated
exclusively for charitable or religious purposes were granted tax-ex-
empt status because of the benefit the public obtains from their activi-
ties.3 ' The grant of exemption is qualified, however, by three re-
quirements: 1) the organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes; 2) no part of the organi-
zation's net earnings may inure to the benefit of a private individual;
and 3) the organization may not be actively involved in legislative
lobbying and political campaigns. 32  In denying exempt status to
communitarian religious organizations, the Service has made two
basic arguments: That such organizations are not organized and oper-
ated exclusively for exempt purposes because furnishing the necessities
of life to their members is a significant non-exempt purpose, and that
27. In recent years, very different religious communities have begun to realize
how much common ground they have in their shared emphasis on community. A
fascinating document of this growing realization is A New Charter for Monasticism,
supra note 12, which records the proceedings of an unprecedented meeting of Chris-
tian Monastic Superiors in Bangkok, Thailand, to discuss the relationships between
Christian, Hindu, Buddhist and other forms of Asian monasticism.
28. C. Green & S. Wells, supra note 16, at 51.
29. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. The income tax imposed by
this Act was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158
U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
30. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II G(a), 38 Stat. 172. The successor of this
statute is now codified at I.R.C. § 501.
31. See H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939) ("[T]he Government
is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.").
32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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the net earnings of such organizations inure to the private benefit of
their members, through the members' receipt of food and shelter. 33
In Beth-El Ministries, Inc. v. United States,34 the leading recent
case in this area, the Service successfully defended its denial of exempt
status to a communitarian religious organization. 35 Beth-El involved
a group whose purpose was "to be a non-profit, interdenominational
religious community. ' 3  The organization had two types of mem-
bers-staff and associates. The staff members lived together as a
Christian community in the fullest sense. 37 The community provided
all staff members with the necessities of life and a parochial school
education for their children. Each staff member committed all of his
possessions to the community upon joining, and those members who
were employed outside the community donated their entire salaries.38
The district court upheld the Service's denial of tax-exempt status to
the organization because "[t]he members of Beth-El receive benefits in
the form of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, recreational facilities
and educational services from the organization. Accordingly, private
benefits inure to the members." 3  The court also relied on the 1928
Court of Claims decision in Hofer v. United States,40 and accepted the
Hofer court's conclusion that "a corporation whose members devoted
their time, services, and earnings to the corporation, whose property
is owned for the common use and benefit of its members, is not a
corporation organized and operated for religious purposes. ' 41 The
Beth-El court thus apparently concluded that communitarian reli-
gious organizations inherently fail to satisfy two of the requirements of
section 501(c)(3). First, the court's reliance on Hofer indicates that
such groups cannot be "organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious . . . purposes."' 42  Second, in concluding that the receipt of
33. See Beth-El Ministries, Inc. v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9412, at 87,517-19 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.). The prohibition against private inure-
ment of net earnings appears redundant, because such a benefit would be Inconsist-
ent with operating exclusively for an exempt purpose. B.H.W. Anesthesia Found.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681, 684 n.3 (1979); Lowry Hosp. Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 850, 857 n.8 (1976).
34. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9412 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.). The organization
involved in Beth-El maintained its action under § 7428 of the Code, which permits
an organization seeking initial or continuing qualification under § 501 (c) (3) to sue for
a declaratory judgment in either the Tax Court, the Court of Claims or the District
Court for the District of Columbia, after its administrative remedies have been
exhausted. I.R.C. § 7428(a)-(b).
35. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,518.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 4-28 and accompanying text.
38. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,518.
39. Id.
40. 64 Ct. Cl. 672 (1928).
41. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,518.
42. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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meals and lodging constituted private benefit, the court found that
Beth-El was an organization "'part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of [a] private shareholder or individual. " 4 3
It is surprising that the Beth-El court took such a narrow view of
the issues before it. In its terse opinion, the court did not even hint at
the existence of the historical and scriptural foundations for the way of
life practiced by the Beth-El community, nor did it engage in the kind
of close statutory analysis which proper treatment of this issue de-
mands. 44
III. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS
A. Operated Exclusively for Religious Purposes
Communitarian religious organizations, by definition, care for the
temporal, as well as the spiritual, needs of their members. 45  Given
the nature of religious communitarianism, tending to these temporal
needs is an aspect of religious observance 46 and is consistent with
being organized exclusively for religious purposes within the meaning
of section 501(c) (3).
It has long been recognized that, in order to decide whether an
organization is operated exclusively for religious purposes, the activi-
ties in which the group engages must be distinguished from the pur-
pose behind those activities.47  The statute itself states that it is the
purpose, and not the activity, which must be exclusively religious.48
The regulations promulgated under section 501(c)(3) also recognize
this distinction: "An organization will be regarded as 'operated exclu-
sively'.for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in
activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes
43. Id. In Martinsville Ministries, Inc. v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9710 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.), Judge Richey, author of the Beth-El opinion,
noted simply that he found the facts of the case indistinguishable from those of Beth-
El, and therefore, granted summary judgment for the government on the issue of
exemption. Id. at 85,329.
44. See United States v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D.
Ill.), af'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
45. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 5.
47. See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional
Problems, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 885, 897-901 (1977); Note, Mail Order Ministries, the
Religious Purpose Exemption and the Constitution, 33 Tax Law. 959, 965-68 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Mail Order Ministries]; cf. Visconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-19 (1972) (evaluated withdrawal of children from public school in light of Amish
religious belief); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (evaluated
Mormon practice of polygamy in light of religious tenets); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 720-22, 394 P.2d 813, 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-75 (1964) (en banc)
(evaluated peyote use by a Native American Church in light of religious purpose).
48. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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specified in section 501(c)(3)." 49  Thus, in determining whether an
organization is operated exclusively for religious purposes, the objec-
tive nature of the organization's activities is not dispositive. Activities
take on their coloration by reason of the purposes for which they are
undertaken. As the Tax Court noted in B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,50 "the purpose towards which an organization's activities
are directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves, is ulti-
mately dispositive of the organization's right to be classified as a
section 501(c)(3) organization." 51 Consequently, to the extent that
the Beth-El court concluded that supplying the necessities of life was
inherently non-religious, it did not properly interpret the statute. It
should have focused on whether the necessities were supplied to ac-
complish an exempt purpose. Given the relationship between the
communitarian way of life and the religious beliefs of the organiza-
tion's members, the argument is sound that the "purpose" of such
activities was to create a totally religious environment.
The tax administrator may not decide whether a particular reli-
gious belief or way of life is fallacious or meritorious, true or false,
reasonable or ridiculous, as long as the belief is sincerely held.-, In
accordance with this principle, a wide range of activities has been
held to be consistent with the operation of an organization exclusively
for religious or charitable purposes.5 3 In Golden Rule Church Associ-
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1981) (emphasis added).
50. 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
51. Id. at 356-57. The same principle had been expressed earlier in Golden Rule
Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719 (1964), where the Tax Court said, "the
statutory language treats as a touchstone, not the organization's activity, but rather
the end for which that activity is undertaken." Id. at 728; see Pulpit Resource v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594, 603 (1978); A.A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 281, at 1443 (1963); Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious
Institutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 Pepperdine L. Rev. 313, 325-32 (1980).
52. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Universal Life Church,
Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974). In an analogous
situation the Court held that the Military Selective Service could not evaluate the
truth or falsity of beliefs espoused by applicants for conscientious objector status
under the Military Training & Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)(1976).
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 166 (1965). The Court stated in Seeger that the appropriate test is whether
the belief is "sincere and meaningful [and occupies] a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God." 380 U.S. at 166.
53. See Saint Germain Found. v. Commissioner, 263 T.C. 648 (1956) (organiza-
tion that sold books, magazines, pamphlets, music and recordings and conducted
classes throughout the U.S. to propagate its religious precepts held to be operated
exclusively for religious purposes despite commercial activities); A.A. Allen Revivals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1435 (1963) (organization that published
and sold magazines, books, pamphlets, pictures, records and Bibles held to be
operated exclusively for religious purposes). The Service itself embraced this concept
1982] TAX STATUS OF COMMUNITARIAV GROUPS
ation v. Commissioner.54 for example, a church subsidiary managed
several businesses-including a laundry. a hotel, a nursery, a ranch
and a sawmill-in order to demonstrate to the world that the
Church's teachings applied to daily business life. 5 The Tax Court
held that the mere fact that religious organizations normally do not
operate such businesses did not justify a refusal to recognize that the
organization at issue had engaged in its activities for exclusively reli-
gious purposes.5 6  The court ruled that the organization was tax-
exempt. 57 Most American religious organizations do not furnish room
and board to their members. That is no reason, however, to refuse to
recognize that organizations which do furnish room and board ma\
do so exclusively for religious purposes.
The position of religious communities is analogous to that presented
in San Francisco Infant School. Inc. v. Comnmissioner." The Service
claimed that the Infant School was not operated exclusively for educa-
tional purposes, because the school also supplied custodial day care
services to its young students.59 The Tax Court rejected the Service's
argument, finding that "the custodial care -,vas a necessary concomi-
tant of the education. Without its custodial services, education could
not have been furnished to its students. "'L'° Similarly. the furnishing
of life's necessities by a religious communitarian organization to its
members can be an activity which is a concomitant part of the organi-
zation's religious purpose.
In similar situations, the Service has accepted the assertion that
room and board can be furnished exclusively for religious purposes."'
Monasteries, convents and religious orders routinely satisfy the tempo-
in Rev. Rul. 79-359, 1979-2 C.B. 226. which involved an organization that pro% ided
burial services that directly supported and maintained basic tenets and helief- of a
religion. Using this same distinction between purposes and acti'itie. the Service
ruled that the organization was operated exclusivel. for charitable purpo-es. Id.
54. 41 T.C. 719 (1964).
55. Id. at 721, 723-24.
56. Id. at 729: see Fowler v. Rhode Island. 345 U.S. 67. 69-70 (1953) "Appel-
lant's sect has conventions that are different from the practices of other relittious
groups. . . But .. . it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice
or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amend-
ment.").
57. 41 T.C. at 732.
58. 69 T.C. 957 (1978).
59. Id. at 964.
60. Id. at 964: see Michigan Early Childhood Ctr.. Inc. %. Commissioner. 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 186, at 810-11 (1978).
61. Rev. Rul. 77-430, 1977-2 C.B. 194 (weekend religious retreat): Re\. Rul. 75-
434, 1975-2 C.B. 205, 206 (organization providing housing and support to missionar%
families in U.S. on furlough).
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ral needs of their members. Most of these organizations are affiliated
with well-established religious orders and have routinely been granted
tax-exempt status by the Service.6 2 When established or long-stand-
ing communities are involved, the Service apparently has no problem
with either of the issues raised in the Beth-El case.6 3 The Service's
treatment of new or unconventional communitarian religious groups
is thus inconsistent with its treatment of long-acknowledged ones."'
B. Serving a Public Interest
In elaboration of the statutory requirement that exempt religious
organizations be operated exclusively for one or more exempt pur-
poses, the Commissioner's regulations state that "[a]n organization is
not organized or operated exclusively for [religious purposes] unless it
serves a public rather than a private interest. "05 This regulation
provides the Service with an argument that communitarian religious
organizations cannot be tax-exempt, because they serve only the pri-
62. Many of these monasteries, convents and religious orders are Roman Catho-
lic, see supra note 11, and are covered by the annual group exemption letter the
Service issues to the United States Catholic Conference. Determination Letter from
Teddy R. Kern, District Director, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, to the United
States Catholic Conference (June 16, 1980) (on file at Fordham Law Review). Thus.
their exempt status is not approved individually, but simply as components of the
Roman Catholic Church in the United States. But see Whelan, supra note 47, at 891-
922 (difficulties with determining the exempt status of organizations under church
auspices).
63. In a series of private letter rulings, the Service confirmed the tax-exempt
status of eleven Cistercian monasteries. Private Letter Rulings Nos. 7838028-7838036
(June 21, 1978). One of the rulings notes that "[a]s long as [a] monk remains in [the]
monastery ...he [will receive] food, shelter, clothing and medical care [for life]."
Private Letter Ruling No. 7838028 (June 21, 1978). The rulings found support of the
monks to be an exempt function of the monastery. See also Rev. Rul. 76-323, 1976.2
C.B. 18 (order supplying room and board to member deemed to be operated -exclu-
sively for religious purposes"); Rev. Rul. 63-209, 1963-3 C.B. 469 (convents exempt
under § 501(c)(3)).
64. This violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. See infra notes
97-101 and accompanying text. It is difficult, however, to prove discriminatory
enforcement by the Service. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972) (group must show "discrimination based
on differences of religion, race, politics or an unacceptable classification" and that
there is "no reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective"), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
65. Treas. Reg. § t.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1981) (emphasis added). The regulation
further states: "Thus, to meet the requirement of this subdivision, it is necessary for
an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of
private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, sharehold-
ers of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private
interests." Id. This requirement of public benefit is consistent with the legislative
history of the tax-exempt status of religious organizations. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
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vate interests of their members.6 6 This point was not raised in the
Beth-El case. When the regulation is considered in light of the statu-
tory language it interprets, however, it is clear that communitarian
religious organizations do not violate the rule prohibiting operation
for private benefit. The primary function of most, if not all, religious
organizations, including communitarian groups, is to provide for the
religious needs of their members. The regulation must therefore be
interpreted to mean that when such needs are satisfied, a religious
organization serves a public interest. 67 To interpret the regulation in
any other way would deprive the vast majority of religious organiza-
tions of their tax-exempt status.
Furthermore, if the Service interprets the statute to require an
organization to do more than serve the needs of its immediate mem-
bership-by proselytizing, sponsoring social welfare programs or
opening its services to the public-the Service would be violating both
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the first
amendment: first, by coercing a particular form of religious expres-
sion,68 and second, by discriminating between religions on the basis of
whether their doctrines coincide with the Service's concept of contri-
bution to a public interest.69
C. Inurement of Net Earnings to Private Individuals
The Beth-El court accepted the Service's argument that the provi-
sion of room and board by a religious organization to its membership
violates the statutory prohibition against the inurement of net earn-
ings to members of the organization.7" Net earnings are the amount
remaining after operating expenses have been deducted from gross
receipts. 71 Operating expenses, therefore, constitute no part of net
66. See Mail Order Ministries, supra note 47, at 968-69.
67. The Service has recognized that the public interest requirement can be met
by serving the interests of the individual members of religious organizations. See Rev.
Rul. 73-285, 1973-2 C.B. 174 (public interest served by organization providing funds
to defend legal suits against sect members prosecuted for violations caused by reli-
gious practice); Rev. Rul. 56-403, 1956-2 C.B. 307 (foundation awarding scholar-
ships to select fraternity served public interest).
68. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728
(1871); United States v. Kauten 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
69. See Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322-24 (D.N.J. 1977), ajfd per
curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 900
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770,
776 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
70. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) j 9412, at 87,518 (D.D.C. 1979).
71. "The term 'net earnings' in the inurement-of-benefit clause, as stated in
section 501 ... has been construed to permit an organization to incur ordinary and
necessary expenditures in the course of its operations without losing its tax-exempt
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earnings. For communitarian religious organizations, the cost of sup-
plying the necessities of life is a reasonable and necessary operating
expense. 2 If the religious purposes of the community are to be
achieved, it is essential that the members live together. Indeed, their
communal life style is an integral part of their religious expression.7 3
It has been recognized that furnishing the necessities of life, under
appropriate circumstances, can be an operating expense that does not
result in private inurement.74  Religious orders, convents and monas-
teries all supply the necessities of life to their members.75  In such
situations, the Service has not alleged that the order's net earnings
inure to the individual members. The Service's position, therefore,
must be that the cost of room and board is an operating expense of
such organizations and that net earnings do not inure to the benefit of
the individual members.
Because communal living is not essential to most religious organiza-
tions, the cost of supplying room, board and other necessities to
members would not be a legitimate expense for most religious organi-
zations. Costs of this nature are, however, necessary expenses of com-
munitarian organizations, because the religious beliefs of their mem-
bers require that they live together as a community.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF CONSISTENCY
The Service has routinely recognized the tax-exempt status of the
convents, monasteries and religious orders of familiar religious
groups, despite their communal lifestyle. 76 Yet, the Service's position
is that the same conduct of supplying room and board, in the context
of a new and unfamiliar religious group, constitutes a significant non-
exempt purpose, serves a private interest and results in the private
inurement of net earnings. This distinctive treatment by the Service
conflicts with the due process clause of the fifth amendment,77 the first
status." Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Ct.
Cl. 1969) (citations omitted); accord Morey v. Riddell, 205 F. Supp. 918, 921 (S.D.
Cal. 1962); A.A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 281, at
1444 (1963).
72. See supra notes 5-28 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
74. See Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 731 (1964)
(church subsidiary furnishing room and board to student ministers); Saint Germain
Found. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 648, 658-59 (1956) (organization teaching reli-
gious principles in several cities paid all teachers' living expenses).
75. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
77. U.S. Const. amend. V; see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954):
Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 536, 541-42 (1981).
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amendment guarantee of religious freedom,7 s and the principle of
administrative consistency.7 9
A. Administrative Consistency
It is a well-established principle of administrative law that an
agency must treat all similarly situated parties alike.80 When a party
challenging an agency's action is able to show apparent inconsistency,
the reviewing court will place the burden on the agency to explain
what relevant differences, if any, exist between the party challenging
the action and other similarly situated parties that have been treated
differently."' If the agency does not explain the apparent inconsist-
ency, or if the reasons it offers are not relevant differences within the
applicable statutory framework, the reviewing court will order the
agency to treat the aggrieved part), in the same way that the agency
has treated other parties.8 -
The demand for administrative consistency is based upon the pre-
sumption that the policies committed to an agency by Congress will be
best implemented if a settled rule is followed .83 "From this presump-
tion flows the agency's duty to explain its departure from prior
norms." 8 4 This duty is to set forth clearly the grounds for the depar-
ture and to specify the factual differences between the cases.85 The
"factual differences [will] serve to distinguish the cases only when
some legislative policy makes the differences relevant to determining
the proper scope of the prior rule."816 In the present context, it would
thus be insufficient for the Service to point out that most of the
communitarian religious organizations it has recognized as tax exempt
78. U.S. Const. amend. I.
79. W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, Administrative Law 393-98 (7th ed.
1979).
80. Id. at 393-98; see Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645,
654-55 (1954); Frozen Food Express, Inc. v. United States, 535 F.2d 877, 880 (5th
Cir. 1976); International Union v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329. 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
CBS v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971);
Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966): Melody Music, Inc. v.
FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808
(1973). Alternatively, the agency may announce a general change in policy, so that it
will henceforth treat all parties in the same way it is treating the party challenging its
action. Id. In the context of the present discussion, this would mean revoking the tax-
exempt status of all religious organizations that furnish food and shelter to their
members.
82. W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, supra note 79, at 394.
83. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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are associated with an old, familiar religious body. The Service must
demonstrate the relevance of such a distinction in light of section 501
(c)(3).18
One commentator has suggested that the Internal Revenue Service
often acts as if it had some special dispensation from the requirement
of consistency that applies to all other administrative agencies.8 8 The
Service's apparent belief that it need not be consistent may be based
partially on the recently enacted provision relating to the disclosure of
private letter rulings. 89 Section 6110(j)(3) provides in part: "Unless
the Secretary otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determi-
nation may not be used or cited as precedent . . . ."0
It is possible to argue that this provision exempts the Service from
the otherwise universal rule that an administrative agency must be
consistent in its treatment of similarly situated parties. 9' Whatever
the validity of that argument in those situations where section 6110
(j)(3) applies, the argument has no application to rulings relating to
tax-exempt status. Section 6110(k)(1) specifically states that section
6110 shall not apply to "any matter to which section 6104 applies."9 2
Because section 501(a) tax exemption applications are governed by
section 6104, the language of section 6110(j) (3) is inapplicable. 3 Addi-
tionally, the Service's claim that it need not be consistent has been
rejected by courts outside the exempt organizations area.94 Conse-
87. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); cf. Niedert Motor Serv. v. United States, 583 F.2d 954,
962 (7th Cir.1978) (ICC must explain departure from prior practice regarding appli-
cation for carrier permits); Squaw Transit Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 492, 495-96
(10th Cir. 1978) (same). Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 560 F.2d 529, 532 (2d Cir. 1977) (FCC must explain variations in consider-
ation of renewal applications); Greyhound Co. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (ICC must explain departure from prior practice regarding
regulation of securities transactions); Contractors Transp. Corp. v. United States,
537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976) (ICC must explain departure from prior practice
regarding application for carrier permits).
88. See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8:12 (2d ed. 1979). Davis
states: "Of all the agencies of the government, the worst offender against sound
principles in the use of precedents may be the Internal Revenue Service.. . . Its basic
attitude is that because consistency is impossible, an effort to be consistent is unneces-
sary; therefore it need not consider precedents, and it may depart from precedents
without explaining why." Id. at 206, 208-09.
89. I.R.C. § 61100)(3); see Emory, Private Rulings: What May Practitioners
Expect from the New Procedure, 47 J. Tax'n 322, 322 (1977).
90. I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
91. 2 K. Davis, supra note 88, § 8:12, at 207-08.
92. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(1).
93. There is no language in § 6104 similar to that of § 6110()(3) regarding the
precedential weight of rulings.
94. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("The Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax another without some rational
basis for the difference."); Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir.)
("consistency over time and uniformity of treatment among taxpayers are proper
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quently, the normal principle of administrative law, that an agency
must treat similarly situated parties consistently, should apply to de-
terminations of tax-exempt status under section 501(a).
This requirement of consistency is further mandated by the guaran-
tee of equal protection of the laws95 and the recognition that -nothing
opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow ...
officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected."9' 6
B. The First Amendment
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the first amend-
ment's prohibition of any law "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion" 9 7 means that the government may not favor any one religion
over another. 98 In Walz v. Tax Commission," the Court said that the
primary purpose of the religion clauses of the first amendment is to
insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded,
and none inhibited." 100 Freedom of religious choice is assured by the
bench marks [by which] to judge IRS actions") (Oakes, J., concurring). cert. denied,
449 U.S. 900 (1980); Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 987 (2d
Cir. 1973) (-[T]he Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly situated
taxpayers; he cannot properly concede capital gains treatment in one case and,
without adequate explanation, dispute it in another having seemingly identical facts
which is pending at the same time."); IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 923
(Ct. Cl. 1965) (like treatment important for all tax rulings), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1028 (1966). Contra Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976) (each case
should be decided on its facts).
95. The due process clause of the fifth amendment requires equal protection of
the laws as applied by a federal agency. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500
(1954) (striking down segregation of public schools as violative of the fifth amend-
ment equal protection and due process guarantees); cJ. American Sugar Ref. Co. v.
Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900) (discrimination based on **differences of color,
race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having
no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers ... would be ... a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes"); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 373-74 (1886) ("Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public author-
ity with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances .... the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.").
96. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
97. U.S. Const. amend. I.
98. Torcaso v. Watkins. 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961): Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1. 15 (1946): see, e.g.. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. 793-94 (1973), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 629-23
(1971); Watson v. Jones. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
99. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
100. Id. at 669.
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clause's proscription of all favoritism in matters of belief. By refusing
to recognize the exempt status of communitarian organizations that
lack the longevity and affiliation of the convents and monasteries of
older religions, the Service violates the first amendment.' 0'
Implicit in the many Supreme Court pronouncements concerning
governmental neutrality among religions is an analysis similar to that
employed under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. As Justice Harlan explained in his concurrence in Walz: "Neu-
trality in [the law's] application requires an equal protection mode of
analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerryman-
ders.' 0 2 The use of the term "religious gerrymanders" emphasizes
that all departures from governmental neutrality among religions are
forbidden, whether overt, or in the form of subtle gerrymandering
that subjects religions to unequal treatment. The discriminatory treat-
ment of communitarian organizations appears to be of the subtle
gerrymander type. It is not officially acknowledged by the Service-
perhaps not even recognized as discrimination-but it is nevertheless
discriminatory, and thus unconstitutional.
In Gillette v. United States, 0 3 the Court concurred with Justice
Harlan's language in Walz, but went on to add that "a claimant
alleging 'gerrymander' must be able to show the absence of a neutral,
secular basis for the lines government has drawn."10 4 In the context
of communitarian religious organizations, the only apparent distinc-
tion between organizations that have been granted exempt status and
those that have not is that the latter tend to be newer organizations,
not formally affiliated with large and well-established churches. This
difference does not constitute a "neutral, secular basis" for distinguish-
ing among organizations. On the contrary, favoring older, larger and
more established organizations simply because they are older, larger
and more established is a clear example of a forbidden establishment
of religion. 105
101. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (government must show "no
partiality to any one group . . . [letting] each flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma").
102. 397 U.S. at 696.
103. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
104. Id. at 452.
105. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968): United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). In a similar case in which the Tax Commission of
New York denied tax-exempt status to the Unification Church because of its political
activities, the special Referee stated: "illf you could point to a structure, a church
structure similar to the Catholic Church with the well-defined sphere of activities of
the Catholic Church, we wouldn't be sitting here and this wouldn't be a case. You
would just fall within the well-recognized parameters." Brief for Petitioner-Appel-
lant at 16-17, Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax
Comm'n, 81 A.D.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1981), rev'd, No. 238 (N.Y. May 6,
1982).
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New or unfamiliar religious groups are entitled to the same treat-
ment afforded more familiar groups.' °" Indeed. by very reason of
their newness and unfamiliarity, such groups are particularly in need
of fair and evenhanded treatment from the government.1 Uninten-
tional discrimination is not immune from challenge: the Supreme
Court has warned of the "'danger of unintended religious discrimina-
tion-a danger that a claim's chances of success would be greater the
more familiar or salient the claim's connection with conventional
religiosity could be made to appear. " I'L' Insofar as communitarian
religious organizations are concerned, the danger has become a real-
itv.
The result of the Service's distinction between religious groups is
that the newer communitarian groups are being singled out and taxed
because of their religious activities. Their communal life. as mandated
by their religion, is the cause of the denial of their exempt status. The
tax imposed on them is in reality a tax on their form of religious
expression. 0 9 The unlimited power to tax is the power to destrov,""
and withholding an otherwise available tax benefit is unmistakably a
penalty.' To validate the Service's action is to sanction a device that
suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of religion as practiced
by minority groups. "12
Given the Service's favorable treatment of traditional communitar-
ian religious organizations. any communitarian religious organization
should be able to obtain a favorable judicial decision based solely on
the Constitution and the principle of administrative consistency, with-
106. See. e.g.. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78. S7 (1944): Malak %, "oji.
440 F. Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (D.N.J. 1977). aff'd per cnriam. 592 F2d 197 1l3d Cir.
1979): Stevens v. Berger. 428 F. Supp. 896. 903-08 (E.D.N.Y. l977. See ,,nerall,,
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion. 91 ltar%. L. Re\. 1056i. 106I1-
72 (1978) (discussing emergence of new religions) [hereinafter cited a% (ontitutional
Definition].
107. See Follett v. Town of McCormick. 321 U.S. 573. 576-77 01D441 Jone,.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584. 622-23 (1942) (Murphy. J.. dissentingi.
108. Gillette v. United States. 401 U.S. 437. 457 (19711.
109. See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets. 604 F.2d 73. 78 (lit Cir. 197.91 TIhe
"allocation and expenditure of [church] funds is intimately bound up in (a church*%
religious] mission .. .and thus is protected by the free exercise clause .. .- ),
110. McCulloch v. Mar'land. 17 U.S. 315. 327. 4 Wheat. 316. 326 (1819). In
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). the Court noted that taxation of relitzious
organizations creates a greater degree of entanglement than does exemption. Id. at
674.
111. See Speisor v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513. 518. 536 (195) (1Dnuglas. J.. concur-
ring).
112. See First Unitarian Church v. Count\ of Lo% Anizeles. 357 U.S. 545. 5-S
(1958) (Douglas, J.. concurring) ("There is no power in our Government to make one
bend his religious scruples to the requirements of this ta\ la" " Cant\uell %. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296. 305 (1940) ("a censorship of reli~inn a% the mean-% of deter.
mining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected b\ the First Amendment"
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out consideration of whether the organization actually meets the re-
quirements of section 501(c)(3). Why, then, is discussion of the statu-
tory issues meaningful? The answer is simple. The Service can solve its
consistency problem in one of two ways. It can recognize the exempt
status of all communitarian organizations, or it can refuse to recognize
the exempt status of any communitarian organization. The Constitu-
tion and the principles of administrative law dictate that the Service
adopt a consistent policy, but they do not dictate what that policy
must be. The proper content of that policy can be determined only by
a careful analysis of the requirements of section 501(c)(3).
V. CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING THE SIRVICE'S POSITION
The Service's consistent exemption of communitarian organizations
connected with the Roman Catholic Church and other well-estab-
lished religions" 3 indicates that the Service recognizes there is nothing
inherently inconsistent with an organization being both communitar-
ian and tax exempt. The Service correctly perceives, however, that the
form of a communitarian religious organization can easily be misused
by persons whose main purpose is to evade taxes." 4 Nevertheless, its
response of denying exemption to new communitarian religious
groups has been overbroad. Potential abuses can be overcome without
a per se denial of exempt status to communitarian organizations other-
wise qualified.
A. The Specter of the "Hippie Communes"
The Service may fear that if it grants exemptions to unusual reli-
gious communities, it will have to grant exemptions to every "hippie
commune" in the country. Although such communes may not be as
numerous as they once were, the Service is understandably unable to
view this prospect with equanimity. The Service's concern, however,
can be assuaged easily: Not all communes are exempt-only those that
are organized and operated for a religious or other exempt purpose are
entitled to that status.1 5 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"" the Supreme
Court very narrowly defined what constitutes such a religious pur-
pose:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be inter-
posed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is
based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses the claims must be rooted in religious belief
113. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
114. See Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 213-14 (1979).
aff'd mem., 631 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1980).
115. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
116. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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.... Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their
subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular
values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the
social values of his time and isolated himself at \Valden Pond, their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses."--
This narrow definition provides the Service with a firm basis for
denying demands for tax-exempt status by countercultural groups.
The majority of these groups are based on precisely the kind of philo-
sophical belief that the Supreme Court stated would not qualify as
religious in nature. '1 8 Those few communal groups that would qual-
ify as religious communities under the Yoder approach should be
given tax-exempt status.
One problem presented by this case-by-case approach is that both
the Service and the courts must inquire into whether particular com-
munes are religious. Such an inquiry, however, does not rise to the
level of excessive entanglement of government in religious matters.""
Section 501(c)(3) continually requires the determination of whether
an organization is religious. Communes present no greater difficulties
in this respect than do other organizations that claim to be religious.
B. Untaxed Benefits
The greatest potential for abuse lies in the untaxed receipt by
members of a religious community of substantial non-cash benefits
from the community, such as food, shelter, clothing and health care.
Yet, the solution to this problem could not be more simple: Tax the
organization's members on the value of the benefits they receive.
There is no inconsistency between treating the organization as tax
exempt and taxing persons who receive economic value from the
organization.120  Exempt organizations commonly pay salaries that
are taxable to the recipients without destroying the community's ex-
empt status.' 2' For example, a minister can receive a salary from his
church, on which he is church on which is a necessary cost of the
117. Id. at 215-16 (emphasis added).
118. But see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (required only
that sincere belief be meaningful and parallel to that filled by orthodox belief in
God).
119. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (some involvement and
entanglement are inevitable); Mail Order Ministries, supra note 47, at 977-81.
120. This taxation may, however, be barred by the existence of a particular
exclusionary provision, such as the exclusion provided by § 107 for the rental value of
parsonages.
121. See Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co. v. United States. 161 F. Supp. 590, 594 (Ct.
Cl. 1958); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 731 (1964).
Saint Germain Found. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 648. 658-59 (1956).
1103
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
operation of the organization. The benefits thus come out of operating
expenses, rather than net earnings, and consequently result in neither
prohibited private inurement 122 nor loss of exempt status. In many
religious communities, the benefits received would be sufficiently
related to work performed for the community to justify treating the
benefits as compensation for services rendered. Even in organizations
where the benefits cannot be treated as compensation, they would
nevertheless fall under the broad sweep of the definition of gross
income in section 61 of the Code.12 3
In any event, the question of whether benefits are taxable to the
recipient is unrelated to the question of whether the community is
exempt. Just as non-exempt entities can make distributions that are
not taxable, such as gifts excludable under section 102 of the Code, 24
exempt organizations can make distributions that are taxable, such as
salaries. Denying religious communities exempt status is an ineffective
and inappropriate way of dealing with the problem of untaxed bene-
fits.
An advantage of taxing all members of religious communities on the
value of benefits received is that it will tend to least affect members of
legitimate religious organizations, and most affect members of sham
or questionable organizations. The standard of living in most sincerely
religious communities is quite low. The members of these organiza-
tions often receive insufficient benefits to generate any tax liability.
On the other hand, the standard of living would naturally be higher
among the members of organizations formed primarily to evade taxes.
Thus, taxing individuals on the value of the benefits received would
go far toward destroying the appeal of the "religious" community as a
device for avoiding taxes, while having little, if any, effect on most
valid religious communities.
C. The Quid Pro Quo Problem
In some religious communities members have outside income from
investments or from part-time employment outside the community,
some or all of which they donate to their community. The Service may
deny exempt status to insure that contributing members will be un-
able to claim improper charitable deductions for their contribu-
tions. 2 5 A full charitable deduction in this situation would be im-
122. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
123. I.R.C. § 61. Certainly, there would be few, if any, situations in which the
benefits would qualify as excludable gifts under the "detached and disinterested
generosity" standard of Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)
(quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
124. I.R.C. § 102.
125. Section 170 of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct a contribution from his
personal income tax if the beneficiary of the contribution is organized exclusively for
religious, educational or charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 170. A similar deduction
appears in the estate tax law, I.R.C. § 2055(a), and in the gift tax law. I.R.C. § 2522.
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proper, because the member max have received substantial benefits
from the organization "in exchange" for his contribution.'-" Solving
this problem, however, does not require the denial of exempt status to
the organization. All that is needed is a determination of the value of
the benefits the member has received in exchange for the donation.
The member is entitled to a deduction to the extent, and only to the
extent, that his contribution exceeds the value of the benefit re-
ceived. 127 This is precisely the approach the Service has long used in
the analogous area of deductions for bargain sales to charities.12S
D. Private Churches
Perhaps the most common form of a sham religious organization is
what might be termed the "private church" or "mail-order minis-
try."12 9 Typically, an individual forms a church and declares himself
to be a minister. He donates or assigns his income to the church,
claiming a charitable deduction for the amounts donated. The
church's money is available to the individual to use as he sees fit in his
capacity as the church's "minister," and he generally uses it to main-
tain the standard of living that he and his family enjoyed before his
ecclesiastical transformation.130 He may also claim that some or all of
the church funds used for his benefit are excludable parsonage allow-
ances under section 107 of the Code. There are many variations in the
details-a private church may be completely independent or it may
be formally, although not financially, affiliated with some national
mail-order ministry, an individual may form his own church or sev-
eral individuals may form a church in which all are ministers, and so
on-but the basic pattern is the same.'13
Although these private churches are not usually communitarian
organizations, they do generally pay the expenses of members and
their families. 132 It may be that the Service is so wary of any new
126. See Riker v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 220. 227-28 (9th Cir. 1957).
127. Of course, the member should not be, in effect, taxed twice for the benefits
received from the organization. If he is taxed on the benefits as compensation, then
the same benefits should not also be used to decrease the amount of his charitable
deduction.
128. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c)(2) (1972): cf. Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-2 C.B.
106 (denying a charitable deduction where the transfer is made in a quid pro quo
context).
129. See Johnstone, Section 501(c)(3) Status for Nonreligious Family Associations
Barred by Recent Cases, 53 J. Tax'n 168 (1980); Mail Order Ministries, supra note
47.
130. See Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1, 4-6
(1981); Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 213-14 (1979), ajf'd
mem., 631 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1980).
131. See Mail Order Ministries, supra note 47, at 961-64, 968-69; infra note 143.
132. See Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 39
(1980) (single family "'church," all funds support home and family expenses), affd,
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religious organization that pays the living expenses of it members that
it has decided to deny exempt status to all such organizations, regard-
less of whether they are sham private churches or sincere communitar-
ian religious organizations. If so, the Service paints with too broad a
brush- especially because the Service has the tools to attack sham
private churches without also attacking sincere religious communi-
ties. 133
Both the Service and the courts have readily recognized that these
private churches fail to satisfy the requirements of section
501(c)(3). 134 They are usually able to demonstrate little or no reli-
gious activity,135 but rather are created and operated for the primary
purpose of tax avoidance. 36 In addition, by serving only the private
interests of their ministers, the churches arguably fail to satisfy the
regulation's requirement that they serve a public, rather than a pri-
vate, interest. 37  Finally, the private churches have no defense
against challenges based on private inurement. 38 The benefits their
ministers receive are, by the very nature of these sham churches,
disproportionate to the services, if any, that the ministers render to the
organizations and are often in direct proportion to the monetary
contributions made. 39  The benefits cannot therefore be justified as
reasonable compensation for services. Nor can they be justified as a
legitimate cost of operation, because supplying the necessities of life to
church members is not essential to the accomplishment of any reli-
gious purpose.
The Service has used these arguments to prevail consistently against
sham private churches. 40  None of these arguments, which have
proven so effective against sham private churches, has any relevance
No. 80-7358 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 1981); Unitary Mission Church v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 507, 513-15 (1980) (all "church" funds supported travel and living expenses of
three ministers), aff'd mem., 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
133. See Rev. Rul. 81-94, 1981-2 I.R.B. 15 (denied a charitable deduction for a
"'minister's" donation of his salary checks to a "church" organized by him); Rev. Rul.
78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69 (same).
134. Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 199-200 (1979)
(self-appointed minister had no theological training, held no services and had no
congregation), afJ'd mem., 631 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1980).
135. See Mail Order Ministries, supra note 47, at 962.
136. Carl v. McGahen, 76 T.C. 41, 43 (1981); Southern Church of Universal Bhd.
Assembled, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1223, 1226-27 (1980); Unitary Mission
Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507, 513-14 (1980), aff'd mem., 647 F.2d 163 (2d
Cir. 1981); J. Howard Self v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1465, 1469 (1981);
Truth Tabernacle v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1405, 1408-09 (1981): Daryl
B. Hall v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 1169, 1170 (1981).
137. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
138. See Mail Order Ministries, supra note 47, at 969-71.
139. See Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1, 3-6
(1981); Unitary Mission Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507, 513-14 (1980), affd
mem., 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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to legitimate communitarian religious organizations.'"4 The Service
can continue to attack sham private churches without threatening the
exempt status of religious communitarian organizations.
E. The Problem of Insincerity
Closely related to the problem of private churches is the problem of
insincerity, which may be the most significant difficulty with granting
exemptions to communitarian religious organizations. Because of the
recent proliferation of unusual new religious organizations, 4- and the
obvious advantages of exempt status, this concern with the good faith
of new organizations is understandable. A substantial minority of new
religious communities may be organized and operated not for reli-
gious purposes but to avoid taxes.143 Traditionally structured monas-
teries and convents, however, are generally familiar and established,
and the Service does not question their sincerity. 144 This may be one
of the reasons for the difference in treatment between monasteries and
convents, on the one hand, and new communitarian organizations, on
the other. But the effect of this approach is necessarily to discourage
new religious organizations while entrenching old ones, resulting in
an establishment of religion.
141. Some legitimate communitarian organizations also have characteristis that
make them particularly suspect. such as an extremcl\ small number of members or
an accumulation of funds far in excess of those needed to meet operating costs. Even
characteristics such as these, however, are not automatic bars to e\emption. An
extremely small number of members may serve as an indication to the Ser ice that it
should look for hidden inurement, but there is nothing inherently non-exempt about
an organization with a small membership. Similarly. an accumulation of funds may
be an indication of the existence of a non-exempt purpose, but funds may also be
accumulated for exempt purposes-such as to finance an organization's expansion.
See Randall Found., Inc. v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1957); Western
Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 212-13 (1979), ajf'd men., 631
F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1980).
142. See Constitutional Definition. supra note 106, at 1069-72.
143. The concerns here are illustrated by the tax revolt in Hardenburgh, New
York. To protest high taxes, 901, of the adult population of the town became
ministers in the Universal Life Church (ULC) and claimed property tax exemptions
as members of the clergy. N.Y. Times, July 17. 1977, at 14, col. 3. The ULC. whose
only creed was "do your own thing." mailed credentials of ministry to anyone
requesting them and sent a doctor of divinity degree to anyone who made a $20 "free
will offering." Id., May 29, 1977. at 26, col. 3. Many of the citizens of Hardenburgh
stated that their action w.'as a direct protest against the erosion of the local tax base
caused by exemptions given to other charitable and religious groups. Id., July 17,
1977, at 14, col. 4. Although the ULC has been granted exempt status, Universal Life
Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770. 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974), its local
"'congregations" have not been as fortunate. See Kellman v. Commissioner, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1508, 1511 (1981): Riemers v. Commissioner. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 838,
841 (1981); Brown v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 542. 546 (1980).
144. See supra note 105.
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The proper response of the Service to suspect claims of religious
motivation is not to deny exemption requests of new or unfamiliar
organizations by applying a standard to them that is not applied to
traditional organizations. Rather, if the Service is concerned about
sincerity, it should investigate sincerity. Although the government
cannot evaluate a religious creed for its truth or falsity, orthodoxy or
unorthodoxy,' 45 it is not without power to prevent the exploitation of
the first amendment by religious frauds.146 A finding that beliefs are
not sincerely held would preclude exempt status because it would
mean that the organization was not, in fact, organized and operated
for religious purposes. 147
While an inquiry into an organization's sincerity must be conducted
with care and sensitivity, 48 it can and must be done. The Service has
recognized that it has "the right and the duty to inquire into the
sincerity of the beliefs professed by a church or [religious] organiza-
tion seeking preferred tax treatment . . . under [section] 501(c)(3)." 14"
In addition, the Tax Court is willing to rely on the degree of sincerity
of an organization's members in deciding the exemption issue.'50
Fortunately, it is usually unnecessary for either the Service or the
courts to rely explicitly on insincerity when denying an exemption
request. Because an organization with insincerely held religious beliefs
is usually a mere tool for enriching those in control, such an organiza-
tion will almost always be marked by prohibited inurement of its
earnings. 151 A denial based on inurement carries considerably less
145. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944); Universal Life Church.
Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974); -see United States v.
Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
146. See Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 394 (5th Cir.) (prisoner's sect orga-
nized to cause or encourage disruption of prison discipline), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1003 (1974), United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (one of the
"LSD and marijuana church" cases).
147. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court
stated that insincere beliefs would not be protected by the first amendment, and
defined insincere beliefs to be those that did "not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or
religious principle but instead rest solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism,
or expediency." Id. at 342-43.
148. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (inquiry into sincerity might become religious persecution).
149. Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Annual Technical Review
Institutes for 1980, at 44 [hereinafter cited as 1980 Exempt Organizations].
150. Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594, 612 (1978); cJ. United States
v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (the "'government['s]
interest in maintaining the integrity of its fiscal policies . . is sufficiently compelling
to justify an' incidental infringement of plaintiff's First Amendment rights" (cita-
tions omitted)), Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
857 (10th Cir. 1972) (first amendment does not preclude evaluation of religious
organization's tax status), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
151. 1980 Exempt Organizations, supra note 149, at 45.
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potential for major controversy than does a denial based on lack of
sincerity.
F. Section 501(d)
Section 501(d)152 of the Code grants exempt status to:
Religious or apostolic associations or corporations, if such associa-
tions or corporations have a common treasury or community trea-
sury, even if such associations or corporations engage in business for
the common benefit of the members, but only if the members
thereof include (at the time of filing their returns) in their gross
income their entire pro rata shares .... of the taxable income of
the association or corporation .... Any amount so included
shall be treated as a dividend received. 53
The Service may feel that it is improper to grant communitarian
organizations exempt status under section 501(c)(3) because certain
communitarian religious organizations are specifically exempted un-
der section 501(d). The latter exemption, however, is unsatisfactory to
most communitarian organizations. First, many communitarian or-
ganizations do not have a common treasury, and so cannot qualify
under section 501(d). Second, exemption under this provision does not
carry with it eligibility to receive deductible charitable contribu-
tions. 1 4
Section 501(d) was added to the Code in 1936 by an amendment
made on the Senate floor. Its legislative history consists solely of a
short speech by Senator Walsh.' 55 Prior to its enactment, several
court decisions had denied exempt status to religious communities that
operated commercial businesses, primarily on the theory that the
operation of the business constituted a substantial non-exempt pur-
152. I.R.C. § 501(d).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 125.
155. 80 Cong. Rec. 9074 (1936) (statement of Sen. Walsh). "Mr. President, under
existing law religious, educational, and charitable corporations are exempt from
taxation under the income-tax title. This amendment adds a new paragraph to
section 101 of the revenue act, which exempts certain corporations from taxation
under the income-tax title. It has been brought to the attention of the committee that
certain religious and apostolic associations and corporations, such as the House of
David and the Shakers, have been taxed as corporations, and that since their rules
prevent their members from being holders of property in an individual capacity the
corporations would be subject to the undistributed-profits tax. These organizations
have a small agricultural or other business. The effect of the proposed amendment is
to exempt these corporations from the normal corporation tax and the undistributed-
profits tax, if their members take up their shares of the corporations' income on their
own individual returns. It is believed that this provision will give them relief, and
their members will be subject to a fair tax." Id.
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pose. 56 Not only were these organizations non-exempt, but because
their rules prevented members from holding property in an individual
capacity, the organizations were also subject to what is now the tax on
accumulated earnings. 1 7 The only purpose of the 1936 amendment
was to relieve such organizations possessed of commercial operations
from the burden of the accumulated earnings tax. 158 The amendment
was to apply only to religious communities with commercial opera-
tions. Before the 1936 amendment, religious communities without
commercial operations, including many monasteries, convents and
religious orders, had been routinely treated by the Service as exempt
under the predecessor of section 501(c)(3), 159 and nothing in the
amendment indicates any congressional intent to change the tax treat-
ment of those organizations. Accordingly, it cannot be construed as
designed to penalize communitarian organizations that were already
eligible for exemption.
In any event, section 501(d) may have lost most of its importance
since the enactment of the unrelated business income tax. 1" 0 The
cases that held organizations with substantial commercial activity to
be non-exempt and thus gave rise to the need for section 501(d) were
decided prior to the enactment of the unrelated business income tax
provisions. With the addition of that tax, the Service recognized that
operation of a trade or business is not a bar to exempt status if the
organization "is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of
carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as defined in section
513." 161 This regulatory statement suggests that as long as the pri-
mary purpose of an organization is the operation of a religious com-
munity, rather than the maintenance of a commercial business, it
should be exempt despite substantial commercial activity. The organi-
zation would, of course, be subject to tax on unrelated business in-
come from its commercial activity. 162  Such an organization would
thus appear to have a choice of being treated as a section 501(c)(3)
organization with unrelated business income or as a section 501(d)
organization.
There might be support, however, for an argument that sections
501(c)(3) and 501(d) are mutually exclusive provisions. In the Su-
156. Hofer v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 672, 683-84 (1928); In re Hutterische
Bruder Gemeinde, 1 B.T.A. 1208, 1211 (1925); see Whelan, supra note 47, at 905-13
(discussion of the Service's treatment of the Christian Brothers' Winery).
157. I.R.C. § 531.
158. See supra note 155.
159. I.R.C. § 101(3) (1935).
160. I.R.C. §§ 511-515.
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1)(1981); see Whelan, supra note 47, at 899-
901.
162. I.R.C. §§ 511-515.
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preme Court's recent decision in HCSC-Laundry v. United States,'13
the Court concluded that a cooperative hospital laundry service can-
not qualify for an exemption under section 501(c) (3). The Court noted
that hospital laundry services are conspicuously absent from section
501(e) of the Code, which provides for the exempt status of various
other kinds of cooperative hospital service organizations.'4 Although
Congress had explicitly considered including laundry service organiza-
tions within section 501(e), it had decided not to do so at the urging of
commercial laundry services. 165 The Court ruled that, given this
legislative history, cooperative hospital service organizations could
qualify for exemption only under section 501(d), 166 thus precluding
the possibility of exemption under section 501(c) (3). 167
If this analysis is applied to communitarian religious organizations,
it could be argued that they must qualify for exemption, if at all,
under section 501(d). That argument, however, will not survive care-
ful analysis. Section 501(d) applies only if the organization's members
include in their gross income their pro rata shares of the organization's
taxable income.168 By its terms then, section 501(d) applies only to
religious and apostolic organizations that have taxable income-in
fact, the legislative history of the provision makes clear that it applies
only to organizations with income from commercial activities.'6 9
Thus, at most, section 501(d) might be the exclusive basis upon which
exemption could be granted to communal organizations with com-
mercial activities.
The legislative history of section 501(d) further demonstrates that
its sole purpose was to confer a new exemption,17 0 not to limit the
exemptions available to communitarian organizations under section
501(c)(3). When the addition of the unrelated business income provi-
sions increased the extent to which an organization could engage in
commercial activities without losing its exempt status under section
501(c)(3), communal organizations with substantial commercial ac-
tivities were among the beneficiaries of that change. To say that they
were not so benefitted, because of section 501(d), would be to turn a
provision that was intended to assist communitarian organizations
with commercial activities into a punitive provision. Such an ap-
proach would, of course, subvert the congressional intent. This situa-
tion is entirely different from section 501(e), wherein Congress inten-
163. 450 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
164. Id. at 6 n.5.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id. at 8 & n.7.
167. Id. at 4, 8.
168. I.R.C. § 501(d).
169. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 155.
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tionally excluded cooperative hospital services from exempt status.' 7 '
Nothing in section 501(d) indicates any congressional intent to exclude
specific organizations from exempt status.
CONCLUSION
The discriminatory manner in which the Service grants exemptions
to familiar communitarian organizations, while denying them to the
unfamiliar, cannot be justified or excused. There will always be some
communitarian religious organizations whose qualifications for ex-
empt status are doubtful, and drawing the line between the exempt
and non-exempt communitarian organizations will not always be
easy. Line-drawing problems will arise most frequently in relation to
the issue of whether an organization is operated exclusively for reli-
gious purposes. Organizations whose activities do not fit the mold of
traditional religious activities will receive especially close scrutiny
from the Service and the courts. The Service must bear in mind,
however, that the crucial issue is not the objective nature of an
organization's activities, but the purpose behind those activities.' 7 2 An
inherently non-exempt activity does not exist. Nor are there any ac-
tivities in which a communitarian religious organization must engage
in order to be exempt.1 73 No doubt, some allegedly religious organi-
zations will be unable to demonstrate that they are operated exclu-
sively for religious purposes. 74 The Service and the courts will not be
able to make this determination, however, simply by referring to
checklists of exempt and non-exempt activities. A delicate inquiry into
the purposes motivating an organization's activities is required. A
case-by-case approach may place more of a burden on the Service, but
it is the only approach that is consistent with the Internal Revenue
Code, the principles of administrative law and the Constitution.
171. See HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 7 (1981) (per curiam).
172. To some extent, the onus falls on the communitarian organization to provide
adequate proof of its purposes and motivations. See Basic Unit Ministry of Alma Karl
Schurig v. Commissioner, No. 81-1247, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 1982) (per
curiam); Beth-El Ministries, Inc. v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9412,
at 87,518 (D.D.C. 1979) (mem.). Because the "focus of [§ 7428] is on the review of
the Service's administrative determination (or failure to make such determination),"
the determination will be made on the basis of the administrative record in the
absence of showing good cause to expand upon the record. Houston Lawyer Referral
Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 570, 573 (1978).
173. See Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196, 210 n.29
(1979), af-'d mem., 631 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1980).
174. See First Libertarian Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 396, 404-05 (1980).
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